Utah State Building Board et al v. George R. Romney et al : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
Utah State Building Board et al v. George R.
Romney et al : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Elliott Lee Pratt; Clyde, Mecham & Pratt; Attorneys for Appellants;
Shirley P. Jones, Jr.; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah State Building Board v. Romney, No. 10143 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4598
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UT.t\H STATE BUILDING 
BOARD, et al, 
Plaintiffs~ 
vs. 
GEORGE R. ROMNEY and M. 
\\'ALLIS ROMNEY, dba G. 
MAURICE ROMNEY COMPA-
NY, a partnership et al, 
Defendants~ Third-Party Plaintiffs~ 
and Appellants~ 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 
COl\'IP ANY, a corporation, 
Third Party Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
10143 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Elliott Lee Pratt, Esquire 
Clyde Mecham & Pratt 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Shirley P. Jones Jr., Esquire 
411 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
ST.ATE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE .... 3 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT-------------- 4! 
UELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL-------------------- 4 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------- 4 
.. \ H n U 1\l E NT ------------------------------------------------------------ 9 
POINT I 
TilE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RE-
SPONDENT'S BOND ARE REASONABLE 
i\ND APPELL1\NT IS BOUND BY THE 
TEHl\IS OF THE BOND AND IS NOT EN-
TITLED TO IMPLY OR READ INTO THE 
BOND TER~IS \VHICH ARE NOT THERE. 9 
POINT II 
IN ANY EYENT, RESPONDENT WAS 
COl\IPLETELY DISCHARGED F R 0 M 
THE OBLIGATION OF ITS BOND BE-
CAlTSE OF~\ lllATERIAL ALTERATION ... 13 
POINT III 
ACTU.AL NOTICE IN LIEU OF WRIT-
TEN NOTICE IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS 
CASE. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
POINT I\r 
THE PRETRIAL ORDER ENTERED 
FEBRUA_RY 25, 1964, (R. 225), WAS A FI-
X AL .AND APPEALABLE ORDER AND 
XO TI:\IEL 1..,. APPEAL THEREFROM WAS 
~tADE BY ... -\PPELLANTS. -------------------------------- 15 
COXCL tTSIOX -------------------------------------------------------- 17 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED 
Bear River Valley Orchard Co. vs. Hanley, 
Page 
15 U. 506, 50 P. 611 ............................................ 16 
Bristol vs. Brent, 35 U. 213, 99 P. 1000 .................... 16 
Corporation of President of LDS vs. Hartford, 
98 U. 297, 95 P. 2d 736 ........................................ II 
R. J. Duam Construction Co. vs. Child, 
247 P. 2d 817, 122 U. 194 .................................. 16 
Spokane Union Stockyards Co. vs. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 105 Wash. 306; 178 P. 3; 50 Am. 
Jr. Sec. 130, Page 990; 144 A.L.R. 1267 .......... 14 
State vs. Booth, 21 U. 88, 59 P. 553 ········-~·-·············· 16 
Stoll vs. Daly Min. Co., 19 U. 271, 57 P. 295 .......... 16 
Ulibarri vs. Christenson, 275 P.2d 170, U. 2d 367 .... 16 
Winnovich vs. Emery, 33 U. 345, 93 P. 988 .............. 16 
ENCYCLOPEDIAS CITED 
50 Am. J ur., .Sec. 42, p. 934 ........................................ 10 
50 Am. J ur., Sec. 48, p. 937 ........................................ 14 
50 Am. J ur., Sec. 50, p. 939 ........................................ 14 
50 Am. J ur., Sec. 130, p. 990 ...................................... 14 
TEXTS CITED 
Appleman Insurance Law and Practice, 
Vol. 10, Sec. 6241 .............................................. 10 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ITT i\ II STATE BUILDING 
IHL\RD, et al, 
Plaintiffs~ 
vs. 
GEOH(~E R. ROMNEY and M. 
\VALLIS ROMNEY, dba G. 
l\IAlTHICE ROMNEY COlVIPA-
N-Y, a partnership et al, 
IJefcndants, Third-Party Plaintiffs~ 
and Appellants~ 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 
COl\IP .ANY, a corpocation, 
Third Party Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
10143 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE)IEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a case involving the construction of the 
terms of a priYate bonding contract between Appellants 
and Respondent. It does not involve a statutory bond 
3 
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or a public bond, but simply the construction of a pri-
vate agreement made at arm's length for sufficient 
consideration between Appellants' subcontractor and 
Respondent bonding company. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court at pretrial correctly ruled that 
Appellants' third party complaint should be dismissed 
with prejudice and upon the merits and the court further 
correctly determined that Appellants-the prime con-
tractor, and its statutory bonding company, American 
Casualty Company-had no cause of action against 
Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to affirm the judgment of the 
lower court and also for a ruling of this court that Ap-
pellants' appeal was not timely filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July, 1959, defendants and appellants, Romney 
Company, entered into a contract as prime contractor 
with the Utah State Building Board for the construc-
tion of a rehabilitation center in the University of Utah 
Medical Center. Defendant, American Casualty Com-
pany of Reading, Pennsylvania, furnished the statutory 
performance and payment bond for the prime contrac-
tor, Romney Company, in connection with the job. 
4 
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Defendant, \Valsh Plumbing Company, entered into 
a subcontract with the prime contractor, Romney Com-
pany, to perform the plumbing portion of the prime 
contract. Homney Coznpany required and obtained from 
third party defendant and respondent, Industrial In-
demnity Company, a private, as distinct from public 
or statutory, subcontractor's bond (pretrial Exhibit 
1) and the judgment ( R. 225) of the Court below 
with respect to this bond is the subject matter of this 
appeal. 
The action was commenced by various laborers, 
-, 
materialmen and suppliers alleging non-payment on 
the job. Defendant, Romney Company and American 
Casualty Company, answered and filed their third 
party complaint ( R. 6) alleging that third party de-
fendant, Industrial Indemnity Com:(>any, was liable 
for the payment of plaintiff's claims on account of the 
subcontractor's bond which it wrote for Walsh Plumb-
ing Company. This bond (Pretrial Exhibit 1) provided 
that Industrial Indemnity Company, as surety, and 
Walsh Plumbing Company as principal 
"are held and firmly bound unto G. Maurice 
Romney Company as obligee, hereinafter called 
owner, for the use and benefit of claimants as 
hereinbelow defined* **to remain in full force 
and effect subject, however, to the following 
conditions * * * 
3. No suit or action shall be commenced here-
under by any claimant. 
(a) Unless claimant shall have given written 
notice to any two of the following: The Princi-
5 
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pal, the Owner, or the Surety above named, 
within ninety {90) days after such claimant did 
or performed the last of the work or labor, or 
furnished the last of the materials for which said 
claim is made, stating with substantial accuracy 
the amount claimed and the name of the party 
to whom the materials were furnished, or for 
whom the work or labor was done or performed. 
Such notice shall he served by mailing the same 
by registered mail, postage prepaid, in an enve-
lope addressed to the Principal, Owner or 
Surety, at any place where an office is regularly 
maintained for the transaction of business, or 
served in any manner in which legal process may 
he served in the state in which the aforesaid 
project is located, save that such service need not 
he made by a public officer." 
It was established from the interrogatories of third 
party defendant and respondent to all plaintiffs and 
claimants, and the admissions of the parties at pre-trial, 
that no claimant had complied with the written notice 
requirements of respondent's bond. 
At the pre-trial hearing held on February 21, 1964, 
the following facts were established by the pleadings, 
admissions of the parties, and statements of counsel 
to the pre-trial Judge. (These facts were set forth in 
the Pre-trial Order (R. 225) numbered in said order as 
follows.) 
3. J. G. Wedding did business prior to October 1, 
1961, as Walsh Plumbing Company. 
4. On or about October 1, 1961, J. G. Wedding 
sold the Walsh Plumbing Company to Sylvia Rhode, 
6 
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who itninediately thereafter incorporated the same as 
\Valsh Plumbing Company, a Nevada corporation. 
5. Pretrial Exhibit 1 is a bond furnished by In-
dustrial Indemnity Company as surety and J. G. Wed-
ding as principal to the G. Maurice Romney Company, 
partnership. 
8. The parties agree that no one gave any notice to 
the Industrial Indemnity Company or to Walsh Plumb-
ing Company or to Romney Company as required in 
Paragraph 3a on page 2 of the Industrial Indemnity 
Company bond. 
9. The Industrial Indemnity Company claims that 
the bond was not made for the benefit of the Romney 
Company but was made for the benefit of materialmen, 
and since no materialmen have given notice as pre-
scribed by Paragraph 3a of the Industrial Indemnity 
bond, the court will hold as a matter of law that Romney 
Company cannot recover under Pretrial Exhibit 1. 
10. On or about October 1, 1961, the principal was 
changed from J. G. Wedding, doing business as Walsh 
Plumbing Company, to the Walsh Plumbing Company, 
a corporation, but no novation or agreement between 
the parties or any of them was ever made to the effect 
that J. G. 'Vedding was relieved from his contract to 
perfonn as made with Romney Company. 
17. It is ordered that the action insofar as the 
Industrial Indemnity Company, a corporation, is con-
cerned be dismissed with prejudice. 
7 
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The Court signed this Order on February 24, 1964, 
and the Order was filed and entered upon the direction 
of the Court, on February 25, 1964. The Order shows 
that a copy was mailed to all attorneys appearing at 
the pre-trial. 
On March 30, 1964, after the time for appeal had 
elapsed, defendant and appellant served a Motion to 
Amend the Pre-Trial Order ( R. 229) and this Motion 
was filed April 2, 1964, and also on April 2, 1964, the 
Court entered its Order denying the Motion (R. 236) 
for no good cause$)lown and for not being timely made. 
A contention was made by defendants and appellants 
that the pre-trial judgment and order was governed by 
Rule 54 (b) U.R.C.P., therefore, in order to clarify 
his intentions with respect to the pre-trial judgment, 
the Judge on April2, 1964, made and entered the nunc 
pro tunc judgment complained of by appellants (R. 
233). All the Court did in this judgment was to recite 
that it appeared to him at the time of pre-trial that 
there was no just reason for delay and also to expressly 
direct the entry of judgment, which judgment, as a 
matter of fact, had already been actually entered by 
the Court itself on February 25, 1964. 
On April 8, 1964, defendant and appellant filed 
their motion to set aside the nunc pro judgment (R. 
252) and this motion was denied by the Court on April 
30, 1964. (See Stipulation of the parties, R. 254). 
Appellants have not appealed from this Order denying 
their motion to set aside the nunc pro tunc judgment. 
8 
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ARGlTl\lENT 
POINT I. 
THE NOTIC~~ PROVISIONS OF RESPOND-
ENT'S BOND ARE REASONABLE AND AP-
PELL.ANT IS BOUND BY THE TERMS OF 
THE BOND AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
IMPLY OR READ INTO THE BOND TERMS 
\VHICH ARE NOT THERE. 
Most of Appellants' brief under its Points A ( 1) 
(2), is devoted to a strange and somewhat speciou~ 
argument to the effect that in some way Appellanh 
were entitled to sue Respondent bonding company for 
the "use and benefit" of themselves rather than for the 
"use and benefit of claimants" as provided in the obli-
gation of the bond. 
Appellant, Romney Company was the prime con-
tractor on this job; Appellant, American Casualty 
Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, furnished the re-
quired statutory bond. Apparently, Appellants de-
sired additional bonding with respect to the subcontrac-
tor. J. G. 'Vedding, dba Walsh Plumbing Company. 
Accordingly, Appellant, Romney Company required 
its subcontractor to enter into a contractual bonding 
agreement with Respondent Industrial Indemnity Com-
pany. This contract was a Labor and Material Payment 
Bond. which bond contract is identified in this record 
as pretrial Exhibit No. 1. In this agreement, Respond-
ent. Industrial Indemnity Company agreed as follows: 
9 
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1. To be "firmly bound unto Romney Company as 
obligee, hereinafter called owner~ for the use and benefit 
of claimants as herein below defined/~ 
2. To "remain in full force and effect, subject, 
however, to the following conditions." These conditions 
are set forth in Paragraph 3 and 3 (a). They, in effect, 
provide that the owner shall have no rights for the use 
and benefit of claimants unless claimants have given the 
required notice as set forth in Paragraph 3 (a) of the 
bond. The plain, ordinary, clearly expressed intent of 
this bond is that the surety will pay the claims of claim-
ants provided that it be given the requisite notice. This 
is perfectly valid, and, in fact, usual, subcontract bond 
condition. Appleman Insurance Law and Practice, 
Volume 10, Section 6241, states the principle involved 
as follows: 
"A notice of default provision under a con-
tractor's bond is a valid and enforceable condi-
tion precedent to liability of the surety. Failure 
to comply by giving proper notice to the surety 
would relieve it of liability" (Citing cases) . 
The principle is also stated in 50 American Juris-
prudence, Section 42, at Page 934, as follows: 
"It is frequently a requirement of fidelity 
bonds and contractor's bonds that notice of de-
fault be given to the insured or surety and if the 
requirement is reasonable, there must be a com-
pliance therewith in order to hold the surety 
liable." 
10 
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.Appellants in their brief, cite the Utah case, Car-
poration of Preside·nt of LDS vs. Hartford, 98 U. 297, 
{);) P. 2rl 736, as supporting their position, but, actually, 
a fair reading of the holding of the case indicates that 
the case supports the position of Respondent because 
the court states that "sureties in building contracts are 
not entitled to any notice of default unless the agree-
ment expressly provides therefor". Here, the bond in 
question does expressly provide for notice. It is un-
controverted that the notice was not given and, there-
fore, the trial court's construction of the bond was 
correct. 
Appellants simply state, without any justification 
therefor in the language of 'the bonding contract, that 
what the bond in effect says, is that if claimants fail to 
give notice as required, then this bond is not for the 
use and benefit of claimants as it says, but is for the 
benefit of the obligee and its statutory surety and will 
permit a suit by them for money owed claimants. It 
would seem on the face of it that this argument is un-
sound. If Appellants had wanted a bond which gave 
them a right to sue in case claimants did not pursue their 
remedies under the subcontractor's bond, then it would 
have been a perfectly simple matter for Appellants 
to require Respondent bonding company to agree to 
such a right of action in the prime contractor. There 
is no such provision in the. instant bond. It is simply 
a bond for the protection and payment of claimants 
for proper claims provided reasonable notice is given as 
provided in Paragraph 3 (a) of the bond. 
11 
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Appellants state in their brief on Page 8, that 
Romney, the ~rime contractor, required Walsh Plumb-
ing, the subcontractor, to furnish a bond "for the satis-
factory performance of this agreement" and cite as 
authority for this statement Exhibit D-16 and "2nd" 
page of Pretrial Exhibit 1. At the time of the pretrial 
there was no Exhibit D-16 before the court and there 
never was any "2nd" page of Pretrial Exhibit 1. This 
"2nd" page was attached to Pretrial Ex. 1 sometime 
after the record was filed in this court. These alleged 
exhibits were not offered by Appellants at pretrial, 
were not before the trial court, and reference to them 
on this appeal is improper and they are in no way 
binding upon Respondent. Pretrial Exhibit 1 was and 
is the bond in question, consisting of one page. It was 
offered into evidence at the pretrial by Respondent. 
There was no 2nd page attached to it at that time and 
Appellants have no right in this appeal to quote this 
alleged 2nd page obtained from sources unknown to 
Respondent. In any event, it is not material in this 
appeal what Appellant Romney may or may not have 
required of the subcontractor in its subcontract. The 
fact remains that if Appellant, Romney, did not like 
the subcontract bond submitted, it was at perfect liberty 
to refuse the same and obtain one containing terms 
more to its liking, particularly in view of the position 
Appellants take in this appeal urging the proposition 
that they are entitled to read terms into the bond which 
are not there. A reading of the cases cited by Appellants 
shows that not one of them supports the construction 
12' 
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of the bond urged by Appellants in this appeal. Ob-
viously ,the obligee is a party to the bonding contract 
and. obviously, he is entitled to have the ter~ns of the 
contraet perfortned. No one disputes this proposition, 
but he is not entitled to turn a simple, ordinary pro-
vision, guaranteeing payments to claimants if their 
claims are properly presented, into a construction that 
said obligee can recover the amounts claimed by claim-
ants whether the conditions of the bond are met or not. 
\Vhat this case really represents is an attempt by the 
prime contractor and its bonding company, American 
Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, to force 
a subcontract bond to pay the obligation for which 
American Casualty is primarily liable under the statute 
and under its bond. 
POINT II 
IN ANY EVENT, RESPONDENT WAS 
CO:\IPLETEL Y DISCHARGED FROM THE 
OBLIGATION OF ITS BOND BECAUSE OF 
A ~IA TERIAL ALTERATION. 
The pretrial Judge's order of dismissal with preju-
dice was not based solely on the proposition that the 
notice provision of the Respondent's bond had not been 
complied with. Paragraph 10 of said Pretrial Order 
(R. 226) explains what happened in this case. On or 
about October 1, 1961, which was prior to the time of 
any default by the subcontractor, the Principal in the 
bond (Pretrial Exhibit 1) was changed. Respondent 
13 
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wrote this bond for J. G. Wedding, doing business as 
Walsh Plumbing Company. In October, 1961, J. G. 
Wedding, dba Walsh Plumbing Company, sold the 
business to one Sylvia Rhode, who thereafter incorpo-
rated the business as Walsh Plumbing Company, a 
Nevada corporation. (Paragraph 4 of the Pretrial Or-
der, R. 226). As is stated in Volume 50, American Juris-
prudence, Section 48, at Page 937: 
"A surety obligation is a contractual one, and 
like other contractual obligations may not be 
altered without the consent of the surety who 
has assumed the obligation." 
And, further, Section 50, Page 939, this: 
"The variations or changes in the suretyship 
contract which, if made without the surety's con-
sent, will discharge him are very often character-
ized by the courts as 'material' alterations, al-
though it is said in some cases that the surety is 
discharged whether the alterations are material 
or not." 
The authorities hold without dissent that a change 
of Principal is a material change in the obligation which 
will discharge the surety from liability. Spokane Union 
Stockyards Co. vs. Maryland Casualty Co._, 105 Wash. 
306; 178 P. 3; 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 130, Page 990; 144 
A.L.R. 1267. Respondent bonding company in this case 
was called upon by Appellants by virtue of their third 
party complaint to pay the debts of a new and substi-
tuted Principal. Appellants did not and cannot show 
that any notice of this change of Principal was given to 
Respondent. 
14 
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POINT III. 
ACTC1\.L NOTICE I~ LIEU OF \VRITTEN 
XO'fll'E IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
Appellants in their brief at Point I (B), Page 15, 
attempt to raise an issue of actual notice. This point 
should not be considered by this court for the following 
reason. On March 30, 1964, Appellants filed and served 
u ~lotion to Atnend the Pretrial Order (R. 229) con-
tending that "actual notice was given sufficient to 
comply with Paragraph 3 (a)". On April 2, 1964, (R. 
:!:W) this Motion was denied by an Order of the trial 
court. Appellants have never appealed from this Order. 
Therefore, this issue has been finally disposed of, and 
is moot. 
POINT IV. 
THE PRETRIAL ORDER ENTERED FEB-
RU.AR\~ 25, 196~, (R. 225), WAS A FINAL AND 
APPEALABLE ORDER AND NO TIMELY 
.APPEAL THEREFROM WAS MADE BY AP-
PELLANTS. 
The Pretrial Order dismisses the action completely 
as far as Respondent, Industrial Indemnity Company, 
was concerned. The dismissal was with prejudice. All 
claims of all parties against Industrial Indemnity Com-
pany were disposed of by this Order. It was not the 
kind of situation contemplated by Rule 54 (b) when 
part of the claims against a party are settled and some 
15 
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remaining claims are left to be disposed of. In many 
cases, this Court has considered what the essentials of 
a final judgment are in order to determine whether or 
not a given judgment is appealable. The Court has 
held that any judgment, terminating litigation between 
parties in the court rendering it, is final. Bear River 
Valley Orchard Co. vs.Hanley~ 15 U. 506, 50 P. 611; 
Stoll vs. Da)y Min. Co~~ 19 u·. 271, 57 P. 295. 
Where the rights of the parties in an action are 
determined by the court and nothing is reserved for 
future determination, the judgment with respect thereto 
is final. State vs. Booth~ 21 U. 88, 59 P. 553. 
The test of finality for purpose of appeal is not 
necessarily whether the whole matter involved in the 
action is concluded, but rather whether the particular 
proceeding with respect to the party involved is termi-
nated by the judgment. Winnovich vs. Emery~ 33 U. 
345, 93 P. 988; Bristol vs. Brent~ 35 U. 213, 99 P. 1000. 
It is quite common under our practice for the pre-
trial Judge to make a final determination based upon 
the pleadings and the statements of counsel at the hear-
ing. Sometimes the order entered is in the nature of a 
summary judgment and sometimes the order disposing 
of the case is just simply an order based upon the pre-
trial hearing. In the following cases the court's dispo-
sition and judgment at pretrial hearing has been rec-
ognized as a final judgment. R. J. Duam Construction 
Company vs. Child~ 247 P. 2d 817, 122 U. 194; Ulibarri 
vs. Christenson~ 275 P. 2d 170, 2 U. 2d 367. 
16 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent's bonding contract is clear and un-
atnbiguous .. Appellants have no right under the agree-
ment to ignore the notice provisions and sue in their 
own name. The notice provisions are reasonable and were 
not cmnplied with. The Principal was changed and a 
new Principal substituted in this contract without the 
consent of Respondent. Finally, the pretrial confer-
ence and judgment finally disposed of all claims against 
third party defendant and Respondent, Industrial In-
demnity Company. It was a final Order. The Order 
itself recited that the dismissal was with prejudice. Said 
Order was promptly mailed to Appellants. No one 
could have been misled with respect to the Court's inten-
tion to make it a final Order. 
Appellants have shown no reason in this case why 
they should be permitted to avoid their obligations as 
the prime contractor and the statutory bonding com-
pany and pass the burden of payment on to the sub-
contractor's bond, contrary to any provision therein or 
any reasonable and just construction of said bond. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Shirley P. Jones, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent 
17 
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